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Knowledge management (KM) is especially difficult to implement for project-based work. 
Tacit knowledge gained during projects diffuses when project teams disband and reform. 
Organizations are increasingly focusing on managing their knowledge flows, developing or 
investing in KM systems. Knowledge-sharing (KS) behaviors are the main input to KM 
systems, so we aim to optimize knowledge input to magnify the usefulness of KM systems. 
We adopt game-theoretic models to analyze workers’ knowledge-sharing dynamics under 
different KM strategies, taking managers’ viewpoints. We will solve Nash Equilibria by 
identifying associated conditions on each equilibrium path, and derive implications from 
these conditions for KM strategies. We will explore: (1) types of knowledge that deserve 
sharing; (2) types of employees that possess different knowledge; (3) incentives that cause 
the right individuals to share useful knowledge; and (4) costs and benefits associated with 
alternative company KM strategies. We plan to validate these theoretical results via an 
empirical study. This paper lays out the problem, discusses the key points of departure, and 
presents our initial version of a game tree for employees’ decisions about knowledge sharing. 
Interviews will subsequently be conducted to validate the game tree, Nash Equilibria, and 
implications for knowledge management in project-based firms. 
Keywords:  Knowledge management; knowledge sharing; project-based firms; game theory; 
Nash Equilibrium. 
Motivation 
In the information age, decision makers are often overloaded with unnecessary and 
irrelevant information. However, if information can be transformed into actionable 
knowledge, decisions can be made more effectively. In the military, this transformation 
achieves command and control (C2) agility (Alberts and Hayes 2003). Moreover, because 
information is an important source of power, effective flow of information/knowledge to the 
“Edge” allows military and civilian leaders to delegate authority and power confidently 
(Alberts and Hayes 2003).  
As Nissen (2006) found, knowledge 
flows can have significant effects on 
organizational performance. From 
Nissen’s spiral knowledge-flow 
visualization, the first stage of 
knowledge flow (depicted in Figure 1) 
from A to B is socialization, which is 
also classified as “sharing” by Nonaka 
(1994).  Recently, many large 
organizations, from manufacturing 
companies to engineering firms to the 
military, have devoted a great deal of 
attention and money to knowledge man
specialized knowledge—both technical and institutional (Javernick-Will, Levitt and Scott 
2007). Acquiring and sharing internal knowledge, when the knowledge is owned by 
employees in an organization, is generally less expensive than acquiring knowledge 
externally. In order to facilitate better management of knowledge, many companies have 
developed Information and Communication Technology (ICT) platforms to motivate the 
transfer of knowledge within an organization and to enhance knowledge accessibility. These 
actions help to overcome a critical attribute of knowledge flow—knowledge inertia (Nissen 
2006); however, the employees’ willingness to share their knowledge freely is a requirement 
for ICT knowledge sharing platforms to be successful and useful (McQuary 2007). 
Organizations investing in ICT pla
Figure 1. Nissen (2006) 
agement, due to their need for sharing scarce, 
tforms often face difficulties in encouraging their 
employees using ICT platforms to share their knowledge (A. Cabrera, E. F. Cabrera 2002). 
For example, Goh (2002) argues that a high level of mutual trust is necessary for this to 
happen. In addition, employees may be afraid of sharing their knowledge, because sharing 
their scarce knowledge might reduce their uniqueness, and hence their power or status. In 
other words, employees are often reluctant to share critical knowledge which is viewed as a 
source of power (Goh 2002; Ho et al., 2006, 2008). Surprisingly, few studies have addressed 
the most fundamental element in knowledge management: the willingness of employees to 
share their knowledge. Most KM literature tends to focus on the "technology side" of KM 
such as platform design and knowledge warehousing issues. Unfortunately, many KM 
attempts involving costly and advanced high-tech information and communication systems 
died when employees were not motivated to share knowledge. Thus, in our research we focus 
on the first stage of Nissen’s knowledge-flow diagram, i.e., socialization/sharing, as a solid 
foundation for the following stages, to help organizations harness the power of their shared 
knowledge. 
Research questions 
research contributes to research area B of the C2 
dom
at are the drivers of knowledge sharing behaviors in organizations? 
ledge. Are they 
diss
at new knowledge taxonomy can be derived from the model of knowledge sharing 
s and the 
des
t are the model’s implications for the design of knowledge management systems 
ry of knowledge sharing dynamics to advance the design of 
kno
s one of four characteristics of knowledge that have critical implications 
for 
The proposed 
ain—Near-Optimizing Knowledge and Power Flows. We expect to answer the following 
three questions in order to help military, other governmental and civilian leaders and policy 
makers facilitate, enhance, measure, and ultimately optimize their organizations’ knowledge 
flows: 
Wh
We aim to study why employees decide to share or not share their know
atisfied with monetary rewards for sharing? Is their failure to share knowledge caused by 
factors such as excessive direct workload or not knowing with whom they can and should 
share? 
Wh
dynamics and how can we identify and manage different kinds of knowledge? 
We aim to develop a knowledge taxonomy to inform knowledge sharing strategie
ign of knowledge management systems and organizations. If knowledge sharing brings 
payoffs greater than zero, organizations should facilitate sharing this type of knowledge. On 
the other hand, if the sharing behavior costs more than the benefits it can bring, no or 
negative incentives should be implemented to discourage this type of unprofitable knowledge 
sharing 
Wha
and organizations?  
We build on the theo
wledge management infrastructure and platforms and organizational controls such as 
incentive systems, rewards, and organizational institutions. Furthermore, the interacting 
effects between KM infrastructure and organization structure on knowledge sharing may 
further complicate the KS problem. We expect to derive important requirements or 
characteristics of KM infrastructure from this new perspective. 
Literature review 
Transferability i
management (Grant 1996). Knowledge transfer requires communication, which involves 
four sequential steps—encoding, communicating, decoding and feedback—for the message 
to be communicated through the channel during the process (Robbins and Decenzo 2004). 
This process also corresponds to Polanyi’s (1967) categorization of knowledge: (1) explicit 
knowledge, which is relatively easy to encode and transmit in systematic language, and (2) 
tacit knowledge, which is difficult to formalize and communicate and is transferred through 
its shared application. However, we also seek to incorporate an important attribute of 
knowledge flow introduced by Nissen (2006) — knowledge inertia. Knowledge does not 
flow spontaneously; instead, immobilized knowledge tends to stay at rest. In order to 
mobilize knowledge, it is necessary to exert a force, either internal or external. Here we will 
focus on evaluating individuals’ internal forces, i.e., willingness, to share their knowledge.  
The construction industry and the military have many project-based activities. The fact 
that




 every project is unique increases the difficulty of capturing knowledge after projects are 
accomplished. Projects like this are “discontinuous organizations” over their life cycle. Team 
members join or leave the group while the work process is still on-going, due to the need for 
different skill requirements in each project phase to complete different parts of the process 
(Ibrahim and Paulson 2005).  A flux of participants over the life of a project creates 
additional demands for effective knowledge sharing. 
In fact, Knowledge sharing can be viewed as a p
cial dilemma” (Connolly and Thorn 1990). Social dilemmas describe paradoxical 
situations in which individual rationality—simply trying to maximize individual 
payoff—leads to collective irrationality (Kollock 1998) and the collective irrationality results 
in collective damage (A. Cabrera, E. F. Cabrera 2002) — in this case, no sharing of 
knowledge. Organizations require information exchanges to function well: Processing 
information enables them to coordinate their specialized and interdependent activities (Jin 
and Levitt 1996). Project-based sectors, in particular, understand that incomplete transfer of 
knowledge can cause unnecessary rework and delay (Paulson 1976; Jin and Levitt 1996). 
From Arthur Andersen Business Consulting (1999), we know that KM = (P+K)S where P 
stands for people, K stands for knowledge, and S stands for sharing. Although we find that 
increases in people, knowledge and sharing promote knowledge management linearly, an 
increase in multi-directional sharing leads to an exponential increase in knowledge 
management effectiveness. However, if the shared knowledge is not valuable to the receiver, 
“knowledge sharing” can lead to less productive organizations due to task interruption. 
The reward system is another key element associated with the effectiveness of know
ring because it affects employees’ willingness to share what they know. Sometimes, 
knowledge sharing does not lead to short term financial benefits to organizations but it brings 
significant benefits in the long run. Hence, to promote knowledge sharing, the reward system 
should be broadly based on other dimensions of performance, such as successful knowledge 
sharing, co-operation, and teamwork, instead of on purely financial outcomes (Goh 2002). A 
good reward system should include fair assessment and explicit recognition of knowledge 
sharing in order to have a positive impact on knowledge providers (Bartol and Srivastava 
2002). Moreover, according to Dyer and Nobeoka (2000), three methods to solve the 
knowledge sharing dilemma are (1) motivating employees and sharing knowledge openly, (2) 
preventing free riders, and (3) reducing the costs associated with valuable knowledge search 
and access. 
The research builds primarily upon the research by Ho, Hsu, Wu, and Lin on implications 
of 
y, source: (Ho et al 2009) 
a game-theoretic knowledge sharing model (2006, 2008, 2009). Effective knowledge 
management systems can help organizations avoid “reinventing the wheel” (Levitt, Scott and 
Javernick-Will 2007). We extend previous knowledge management research by focusing on 
understanding and modeling workers’ incentives to share knowledge, thereby enhancing the 
effectiveness and profitability of knowledge management systems. In the past, knowledge is 
classified into two groups, explicit knowledge and implicit or “tacit” knowledge. The 
categorization functions well in most cases but it is based on individuals’ viewpoints. When 
military leaders manage knowledge in organizations, however, benefits to organizations 
acquired from knowledge sharing should be taken into consideration as well, in order to 
evaluate its profitability. Ho (2006) incorporated this critical factor and established a new 
framework for knowledge categorization, taking a higher organizational level viewpoint 
(Table 1). We will build on and refine his framework to develop a new knowledge taxonomy. 
Details are provided in the research design section. 
Table 1: Ho’s knowledge taxonom
Value to firm, π
Low γ2 High γ2 Low γ2 High γ2
Low γ1 Simple Knowledge Core Simple Knowledge




Special Knowledge Core Unique Knowledge
Low π High π
Employees' implicit sharing cost, γ2
 
According to Ho et al. (2006) and Davenport and Prusak (1998), employees have three 
reasons to share their knowledge: monetary rewards, reputation and altruism. Interestingly, in 
a later empirical study by Ho et al. (2009), monetary rewards were found to have much less 
influence than either reputation or altruism on sharing behaviors of all types of knowledge. 
Furthermore, based on Ho at al. (2009), monetary rewards are not an effective approach to 
promote the sharing of desired or core types of knowledge for several reasons. The relatively 
small role of monetary reward was also noted in research conducted by Bobrow and Whalen 
(2002) on the well-known Xerox knowledge management system, “Eureka.”  In Xerox’s 
widely admired Eureka system, service technicians stated that building a reputation for 
competence within their “natural community of practice” of fellow service technicians was a 
significant and major incentive for knowledge sharing. Including knowledge providers’ 
names along with shared knowledge is one meaningful way to harness this important positive 
reinforcement for knowledge sharing (Bobrow and Whalen 2002). 
We, therefore, build on and modify the knowledge sharing model developed by Ho et al. 
(20
e tree with these changes can represent the actual sharing 
mec
as been successfully applied to many important economic issues. Moreover, 
a g
ews with US 
con
06). Ho’s (2006) model was tested by an empirical study after the knowledge sharing 
model was built from an extensive literature review. This paper, in contrast, starts from 
combining results from his previous work as well as findings from several case studies with 
US construction firms using grounded theory case studies, as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) 
to build a new game-theoretic model. We selected this research strategy because although a 
great deal of research has been conducted in the KM field, no strong theory has been 
developed, especially in the domain of KS behavior. We aim to develop a novel theory that is 
testable and empirically valid, so Eisenhardt’s (1989) grounded theory development approach 
is appropriate. Thus, we will scrutinize the pattern of information collected from 
ethnographic interviews and incorporate Ho’s previous findings to rethink what factors 
actually drive employees’ KS behavior and build a new knowledge sharing model for further 
analysis and empirical testing. 
We believe that a new gam
hanisms used by today’s “Web 2.0” knowledge workers more accurately than prior 
models. Thus, we expect that the new Nash Equilibria in the revised game-theoretic model 
will provide more useful insights for managers of “Millennial” or “NetGen” workers who 
have grown up effortlessly sharing knowledge and information digitally from the time they 
first texted, emailed, blogged, Facebooked or Twittered (Wikipedia 2009). 
Research Design 
Game theory h
ame-theoretic model can be an appropriate tool to predict what the optimal strategies are 
for organizations and employees, and the equilibrium conditions. In this research, we will use 
game theory for theoretical investigation and analysis. Although we replicate Ho’s analysis 
steps, we have modified his game-theoretic model to derive new implications. 
Before building the new game-theoretic model, ethnographic intervi
struction firms are being used to gain insight about the drivers of knowledge sharing 
behavior. Ho’s empirical study (2009) that examined employees’ sharing attitude shown the 
necessity of refining the game-theoretic model used in that study, since monetary rewards 
were designed as a major factor affecting employees’ knowledge sharing behavior, but 
monetary rewards have been shown there and in other US-based studies to be a less important 
factor than reputational rewards and altruistic rewards. Therefore, the new game-theoretic 
model will increase the level of importance of reputational rewards and altruistic rewards, 
decrease the level of importance of monetary rewards, and, meanwhile, incorporate new 
insights from ethnographic interviews. 
Key concepts in game theory used in this research are introduced as follows: 
Nas
ng behavior within organizations involves a trade-off between costs and 
pay
y, games are classified by the completeness of information as well as the 
way
l choose the strategy which maximizes their benefits among 
thes
Given th iously chosen by player 1 for each scenario, the strategy that enables 
Since player 1 should anticipate player 2’s reaction, R2 (a1), player 1 wants to maximize his 
Model of Knowledge Sharing: 




offs. In game theory, people are assumed to be rational and a Nash Equilibrium is a set of 
choices by all of the players in the “game” which can be viewed as “strategically stable” or 
“self-enforcing” because no single player can improve her/his payoff in the game by 
unilaterally deviating from their current choice (Gibbons 1992). Simply put, this strategy is 
the best response by each player to other players’ current choices. So it is inherently stable 
and is resistant to attempts by any individual or group to change it, even if it is not optimal 
for the whole organization. 
Types of games: 
In game theor
 in which games are played (i.e., static games versus dynamic games). We will use a 
dynamic game with perfect information because: (1) players are able to observe others’ 
actions and (2) the game involves a series of sequential interactions between organizations 
and employees. A dynamic game model for knowledge sharing with perfect information can 
be defined, involving three steps. First, player 1 plays his strategy (organizations decide 
whether to install ICT platform). Second, player 2 observes player 1’s strategy. Finally, player 
2 plays his strategy (employees decide whether to share their knowledge) and the game ends. 
Backward Induction Solution: 
As rational players, they wil
e options and thus a backward induction solution will be utilized in this research. The 
backward induction method is described as follows: 
max π2 (a1, a2) 
e action a1 prev
player 2 to maximize his payoff is his best response denoted by R2 (a1). 
max π1 (a1, R2 (a1)) 
payoff when player 2 plays R2 (a1). If player 1’s best response is denoted by a1*, we call 
(a1*, R2 (a1*)) the backward induction solution 
 
Figure 2 below shows the ga
h branch of the game tree (enclosed in parentheses on the right,), the expression before the 
comma is the organization’s payoff, and the expression for the employee’s payoff is shown 
after the comma. Building on the results from Ho’s empirical study (Ho et al. 2009), we 
de-emphasize the monetary reward variable, ω, and we break side benefits, S, into two parts, 
altruism, A, and reputation, R. Figure 3 shows the initially revised game tree that will be 
utilized as a starting point for this research. We realize that it might be difficult for 
researchers, organizations and employees to determine the precise actual value of every 
single variable such as d, π, CP, since the value could be subjective. Thus, we will focus on 
deriving qualitative implications from our game-theoretic model after Nash Equilibria and 
associated conditions have been identified. 
 
Figure 2. Game tree to be modified (adapted from Ho et al. 2006) 
 
Figure 3. Modified game tree 
Variables for employees: 
γ1: The explicit cost of sharing knowledge 
The oney and effort to share individuals’ 
Afte
efits from special recognition (e.g., self-satisfaction, reputation) 
In th 't resist: the 
E.g., s from colleagues. 
for providing monetary rewards 
Orga they bring companies positive 
 
Emp ful and valuable knowledge, and 
f organizations’ benefits  
The r knowledge rapidly through an ICT 
 
be f
explicit cost results from necessary time, m
knowledge. Individuals are less willing to share their knowledge when this parameter is high. 
γ2: The implicit cost of sharing knowledge 
r sharing their knowledge, individuals may incur undesirable hidden costs due to loss of 
power, status or uniqueness. Many organizations evaluate their employees in terms of relative 
performance, so employees are less willing to share specialized knowledge that they alone 
hold. The degree of the implicit cost depends on how rare or important the knowledge is 
perceived to be. 
R: The ben
e Eureka case, the system offered something that Xerox technicians couldn
chance to share their successes with others in their copier technician “community of practice” 
on a global scale, in order to enhance their status in the copier technician community. 
A: The benefits of helping others (i.e., Altruism) 
 feeling happy because of receiving smiles or thank
Variables for organizations: 
CR: Organization’s costs 
nizations are willing to incentivize knowledge sharers if 
payoffs. This cost of providing monetary incentives exists even if employees do not perceive 
these rewards as a meaningful incentive to share their knowledge. 
CP: The cost of the ICT platform installation and maintenance
π: Organization’s benefit due to knowledge sharing  
loyees can deliver higher performance by gaining use
thus increase the organizations’ revenues and/or lower its costs. 
System-related variables 
d: The multiplier, π, o
ability for employees worldwide to share thei
platform can multiply the benefits organizations obtain by capturing and sharing knowledge. 
Please note that, the initially revised game-theoretic model shown in Figure 3 is likely to
urther modified as our ethnographic interviews proceed. Ethnographic interviews are used 
here because building a novel theory requires flexibility and adjustment (Eisenhardt 1989). 
We expect to find different Nash Equilibria and associated conditions from the new 
game-theoretic model by replicating Ho’s (2006) reasoning process. 
Conclusion 
This research has been designed to respond to Ho et al.’s (2009) urge for a refinement of 
the 
S. and Hayes, R. E. (2003). “Power to the Edge: Command, Control in the 
App  Patterns in the 
Bar ng: The role of 
Bob nowledge sharing in practice: the Eureka story. 
Cab ring Dilemmas.” Organization 
Con  (1990). “‘Discretionary databases: theory, data, and 
Dav orking Knowledge.” Harvard Business School 
Dye Nobeoka, K (2000). “Creating and Managing a High-Performance 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). “Building Theories from Case Study Research.” The Academy of 
Gib n University Press. 
k and 
Gra nowledge-based theory of the firm." Strategic management 
Ho, (2009). “Beyond Knowledge Management Platforms: Design 
Ho, nd Wang, C. (2008). “How knowledge is shared in organizations: 
game-theoretic model built in 2006. The researchers are in the process of conducting 
ethnographic interviews to refine the original model. Our goal is to develop more precise 
knowledge management strategies by using the new game-theoretic model to analyze the 
dynamics of knowledge sharing behavior. Based on the new game-theoretic model, a new 
knowledge taxonomy is also expected to be introduced. An empirical study will subsequently 
be conducted to validate our theoretical results. 
References 
Alberts, D. 
Information Age." Washington, D.C.: CCRP Publication Series, 2003 
leyard, M. (1996), “How Does Knowledge Flow? Interfirm
Semiconductor Industry”. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 137-154.” 
tol, K. M. and Srivastava, A. (2002). “Encouraging knowledge shari
organizational reward systems,” Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies; Summer 
2002; 9, 1; ABI/INFORM Global, P. 64. 
row, D. G.and Whalen, J. Community k
Reflections, the SOL Journal. 2002 Winter; 4 (2): 47-59. 
rera, A. and Cabrera, E. F. (2002). “Knowledge-Sha
Studies, vol. 23, issue 5, 2002 
nolly, T and Thorn B. K.
implications”, Organizations and communication technology journal: Fulk and C. 
Steinfield (eds.), 219-233. London: Sage. 
enport, T. H. and Prusak, L.  (1998). “W
Press, Boston 
r, J. H and 
Knowledge-Sharing Network: The TOYOTA Case.” Strategic Management Journal 21: 
345–367 (2000) 
Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), pp. 532-550 
bons, R. (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeto
Goh, S. C. (2002). “Managing effective knowledge transfer: an integrative framewor
some practice implications.” 
nt, R. M. (1996). "Toward a k
journal 17 (Winter): P. 109. 
 S. Ping, Hsu, Y., and E. Lin 
of Organizational Controls in Managing Knowledge.” Proceedings of the 26th ISARC, 
Austin, Texas USA 
 S. Ping, Hsu, Y., a
Model and empirical evidence.” Proceedings of 11th Asia-Pacific Conference on 
Structural Engineering & Construction (EASEC-11), Taipei, TAIWAN.   
 S. Ping, Wu, P., and Hsu, Y. (2006). “Knowledge Sharing Model and itsHo,  Implication on 
Ibra B. C., Jr. 2005. “Discontinuity in organizations: How environmental 
Jav  Scott, W. R. (2007). “Understanding Knowledge 
Jin, f project 
Kol w of 
Mc sentation to “Managing Global Initiatives” class of Stanford 
Knowledge Categorization and Management.” Proceedings of the 23rd ISARC, Tokyo, 
Japan, pp. 858-863. 
him R. and Paulson 
characteristics contribute to the project's knowledge loss phenomenon.” CRGP Working 
Paper 12, Stanford University, CA. 
ernick-Will, A., Levitt, R. E., and
Acquisition, Integration and Transfer by Global Development, Engineering and 
Construction Firms.” CRGP Working Paper 28 / CIFE, Stanford University, CA 
 Y. and Levitt, R. E. (1996). "The virtual design team: A computational model o
organizations." Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 2(3): 171-195. 
lock, P. (1998). “Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation.” Annual Revie
Sociology 22: 183-205. 
Quary, John (2007). Pre
Advanced Project Management Program, http://apm.stanford.edu   
sen, M. E. (2006). “Harnessing Knowledge Dynamics: PrincipNis led Organizational 
Paulson, B. C. J. (1976). "Designing to Reduce Construction Costs." Journal of the 
Pol rence.” Philosophy, 41(1): p.1-18, 1966. 
all. 
Knowing and Learning.” 
Construction Division 102(4): 587-592. 
anyi, M. (1967), “The Logic of Tacit Infe
Robbins, S. P. and Decenzo, D. A. (2004). “Fundamentals of Management.” Prentice H
Wikipedia (2009).   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generation_Y 
 
 
